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3 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation between [] and [] - 29 May 1952

1. At []'s request, I called on him at his home on the evening of 29 May 1952. He opened the conversation by stating that he had just received a telegram from [] (of the SS Albanian desk) requesting advice as to our latest policy regarding air drops into Albania of food and articles for propaganda purposes. According to [] [] [] last understanding was that we still favored such drops, but since the British were planning to make an article raid in mid-June, he wished to confirm his understanding.

2. I replied that we had been reviewing and reconsidering our article and food drop program ever since the Hoxha accusations at the Tirana party congress, and had had the program in suspense since that time. We had reached a final determination only in the past few days, and had not decided to permit only body resupply and leaflet drops. Until the situation changed materially, we were now determined to make no food or article drops of any kind. In response to his question, I told []

[] that the matter had been thoroughly discussed at the highest levels in the Agency, and that my understanding was that General Smith had personally confirmed the final decision regarding this matter. I concluded that we were cabling [] advice of this policy for his discussion with [].

3. Regarding []'s mid-June article raid, we both agreed that in the interests of keeping the actions of the two services consistent, it would be better if it were scrubbed, or at least postponed. I stressed that we were in no position to do more than suggest this to []; that we did not wish to appear to be requiring him to fit his operations to our policies. []

[] stated he was sure that [] [] would understand that, but that he would make the point in his message to [] in which he planned to recommend that the mid-June raid be cancelled.

4. I told [] that we were sending a telegram to [] giving him the policy on drops, and briefing him for his next discussion with [] [] which presumably would take place after the latter had received advice from [].

5. The conversation then turned to other matters of no particular moment. The only subject raised of possible interest was that of the U. S. commitment of British troops to Keje. []

[] stated that

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

He stated that the reaction in British government circles to this action had been extraordinarily strong, even to say violent. He said that the Canadian reaction was mild compared to theirs, and that we should not be led astray by the lack of newspaper publicity regarding the matter. Later in the evening he returned to this matter, and dwelt further upon it, as if he were preoccupied with the subject, or had been instructed to impress himself strongly when discussing it.

Acting Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

SE/PO-DSW-avm

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